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Passive Disposal of the Innocent
Landowner Defense
SHANE CLANTON*
In 1986 when Congress passed the Superfund Amendment
and Reauthorization Act (SARA), which amended the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA), the innocent landowner defense was
congressionally sanctioned.' Current court decisions threaten to
demolish this congressionally authorized defense to CERCLA lia-
bility by their interpretation of "disposal" to include passive mi-
gration of hazardous substances. This article examines both the
effect of these recent decisions on the innocent landowner defense
and the validity of these decisions under the currently existing
statutory scheme and recommends congressional action to remedy
the problem.
1. THE INNOCENT LANDOWNER DEFENSE
One group of potentially responsible parties (PRPs) under
CERCLAa are those persons "who at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such
* Associate, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, Atlanta Georgia; J.D., 1992, Em-
ory University; B.S., 1989, Milligan College. I would like to thank Richard H. Willis for
his guidance, insight, and input in the preparation of this article.
CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988) as amended by the
Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
I Prior to SARA, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988), at least one court had recognized the
possibility of an innocent landowner defense as one type of the third-party defense author-
ized by CERCLA. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994
(E.D. Pa. 1985).
1 CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). Due to the limitation of length,
this article does not describe the CERCLA liability scheme in detail, except as is necessary
for discussing the innocent landowner defense. For an overview of the CERCLA liability
scheme, see generally, CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269, 1276
(W.D. Mich. 1991); B. Shane Clanton, Fleeting Security: CERCLA Liability for Secured
Creditors, 41 Emory L.J. 167, 167-78 (1992),
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hazardous substances were disposed of."4 One of the limited de-
fenses to CERCLA liability is the third-party defense." The inno-
cent landowner defense is one type of third-party defense which
Congress specifically sanctioned and defined6 in its 1986 amend-
ments to CERCLA. Under the third-party defense, a defendant
must demonstrate that a "totally unrelated third party is the sole
cause of the release"7 or threatened release. In order to qualify for
the third party defense, a defendant must establish:
1. the release or threat of release and the damages resulting
therefrom were caused solely by" an act or omission of a third
party;
2. the third party was not an employee or agent of defendant or
one whose act or omission occurred in connection with a direct
or indirect contractual relationship with the defendant;
3. the defendant "exercised due care with respect to the hazard-
ous substance concerned" in light of all relevant facts, circum-
stances, and characteristics; and
4. the defendant took precautions against foreseeable acts, omis-
sions, and consequences thereof, of the third party.
SARA further defined various elements of the third-party de-
fense as it applies to potential innocent landowners. First, the term
1 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988). Throughout this article, such parties will be re-
ferred to as "previous," "past," or "intervening" owners or operators.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988)
A person is an "innocent landowner" when:
[TIhe real property on which the facility concerned is located was acquired
by the defendant after the disposal or placement of the hazardous substance
on, in, or at the facility, and one or more of the circumstances described in
clause (i), (ii), or (iii) is also established by the defendant by the preponder-
ance of the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did
not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance
which is the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed
of on, in, or at the facility
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the facility
by escheat, or through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition,
or through the exercise of eminent domain authority by purchase or
condemnation
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A).
O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 728 (D.R.I. 1988) (emphasis in original) (quot-
ing United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053 (C.D. Cal. 1987)), aff'd, 883 F.2d
176 (lst Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990).
8 ONeil, 682 F. Supp. at 720 n.2. But cf. Lincoln Prop., Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp.
1528, 1542 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (incorporating the concept of proximate cause into the phrase
-caused solely by").
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"contractual relationship" was defined to include "land contracts,
deeds or other instruments transferring title or possession, unless
the real property on which the facility concerned is located was
acquired by the defendant after the disposal or placement of the
hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility," and one of the
three following circumstances is also established:'
1. at the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant
did not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous
substance which was the subject of the release or threatened re-
lease was disposed of on, in, or at the facility;10
2. the defendant is a government entity which acquired the fa-
cility by some involuntary transfer or by eminent domain; or
3. the defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or
bequest.1
Thus, a relationship in the chain of title of real property qual-
ifies as a contractual relationship 2 under § 107(b)(3) and thereby
defeats the innocent landowner defense unless the real property
was acquired after "the disposal or placement of the hazardous
substance on, in, or at" the property and certain other require-
ments are also satisfied.'"
II. PASSIVE DISPOSAL DESTROYS THE INNOCENT LANDOWNER
DEFENSE
In cases involving previous owners and operators, several re-
cent cases have construed the term "disposal" to include the pas-
sive migration through the ground, water, or air, of hazardous
substances previously placed into the environment by someone
CERCLA §101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (Supp. 1993).
10 If the defense relies on this provision, the defendant must also establish that at the
time of purchase, it undertook all appropriate inquiry into previous ownership and uses of
the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice. The court takes into
account any special knowledge or experience of the defendant, the relationship of the sales
price to the uncontaminated value of the property, and other factors. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(35)(B). What constitutes "good commercial or customary practice" is judged by
what good commercial or customary practices were at the time of purchase, not under
today's heightened standard. H.R.W. Systems, Inc. v. Washington Gas Light Co., 823 F.
Supp. 318, 348 (D. Md. 1993). But see United States v. Serafini, 711 F. Supp. 197, 197-98
(M.D. Pa. 1988) (holding an inspection may be required even if purchase occurred before
CERCLA was adopted).
" 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i)-(iii) (Supp. 1993).
" United States v. Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 558 (W.D.
N.Y. 1988).
1" 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (Supp. 1993).
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else." Such an interpretation of disposal destroys the innocent
landowner defense because the defense can only apply to persons
who acquired the property "after the disposal."' 5 If the continued
passive migration constitutes disposal, then otherwise innocent
landowners will, nonetheless, be ineligible for the defense because
they will not have acquired the property after disposal, but will
have acquired it during disposal.
A. Nurad, Inc. v. William Hooper & Sons Co."6
In a case applying the previous owner and operator provision
of section 9607(a)(2), the Fourth Circuit recently held that pas-
sive migration of previously deposited hazardous substances con-
stituted disposal so as to render the prior owner of the facility
liable.' 7 In Nurad, the current owner of certain real property
brought an action against previous owners, including the original
owner, intervening owners, and previous tenants, seeking reim-
bursement of response costs incurred in removing some under-
ground storage tanks (USTs) and their hazardous contents."' The
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment to the intervening owners on the grounds that the dis-
trict court too narrowly construed the CERCLA definition of
disposal."'
" See, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hoopers & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir,
1992), cert. denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1992); H.R.W. Systems, 823 F. Supp. at 318;
Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528 (E.D. Cal. 1992); C.P.C. Int'l, Inc.
v. Aerojet-General Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (holding "unchecked spread of contam-
inated ground water qualifies as disposal"); Stanley Works v. Snydergeneral Corp., 781 F.
Supp. 659 (ED. Cal. 1990); see also Pantry, Inc. v. Stop-N-Go Foods, Inc., 796 F. Supp.
1171 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (holding that under Kentucky environmental statute, leaking of
wastes from USTs is disposal, regardless of whether there is awareness of the leak or
whether owner injected any waste into the UST); Emhart Indus., Inc. v. Duracell Int'l,
Inc., 665 F. Supp. 549, 574 (M.D. Tenn. 1987) (leaking USTs and continued leaching and
seepage are a release or threatened release).
-0 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (Supp. 1993).
16 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992).
17 Id. at 845-46.
" Id. at 840. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment to the former tenants because those former tenants did not have the authority to
control the relevant facility, i.e., the USTs, id. at 842-44. The Fourth Circuit also affirmed
the summary judgment granted to two individual corporate officers of the original owner
because of their lack of authority to control the USTs, id. at 844. The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the summary judgment granted against the original owner of the USTs, id. at
840. Only the claims against the intervening owners are of interest for purposes of this
article.
11 Nurad, 966 F.2d at 840.
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In its definition section, CERCLA does not independently de-
fine disposal, but instead adopts the definition of disposal found in
the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA). 20 That definition states:
The term "disposal" means the discharge, deposit, injection,
dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or haz-
ardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid
waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter
the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into
any waters, including ground waters."1
The Fourth Circuit noted that some of the relevant terms
"readily admit to a passive component: hazardous waste may leak
or spill without any active human participation." 2 Other federal
courts have latched onto this seemingly simple concept as the ba-
sis for determining that disposal includes passive migration of pre-
viously disposed wastes."8 The Fourth Circuit also stated that a
less expansive "construction of 'disposal' ignores the language of
the statute, contradicts clear circuit precedent, and frustrates the
fundamental purposes of CERCLA.
2 4
"Congress intended to impose liability on those parties who
'caused or contributed to a release or threatened release of haz-
ardous waste.' "5 Contrary to the assertion of the Fourth Circuit,
it is far from clear whether a narrower interpretation of "dispo-
sal" would impinge on this congressional intent. If a previous
owner is liable under CERCLA only because of passive migration
of hazardous substances during its ownership, imposing liability
on that owner does not necessarily support the congressional in-
10 CERCLA § 101(29), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (1988) (adopting "the meaning pro-
vided in section 1004 of" SWDA 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k).
2- 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988).
22 Nurad, 966 F.2d at 845.
" See, e.g., H.R.W. Systems, Inc. v. Washington Gas Light Co., 823 F. Supp. 318
(D. Md. 1993); C.P.C. Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gencral Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269 (W.D.
Mich. 1991).
14 Nurad, 966 F.2d at 844.
28 Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1343
(9th Cir. 1992) (citing H.R. REP No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1980), reprinted in
1980 US.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6136); see C.P.C. Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 759 F.
Supp. 1269 (W.D. Mich. 1971). "[C]ourts have emphasized that ... the statutory lan-
guage should be construed expansively in order to give effect to Congressional intent that
all who participate in the generation and disposal of hazardous wastes should share in
cleaning up the harm from their activity." C.P.C. Int'l, 759 F. Supp. at 1277 (citation
omitted).
1993-94]
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tent of imposing liability on those who "caused or contributed" to
the release.
The Fourth Circuit postulated that a narrower definition of
disposal would "frustrate the statutory policy of encouraging 'vol-
untary private action to remedy environmental hazards.' "26 The
Fourth Circuit theorized that an owner could avoid liability by
doing nothing "while an environmental hazard fester[ed] on his
property" and then transferring the property before any response
costs were incurred.17 However, that fear simply will not be real-
ized under CERCLA. If any owner obtains knowledge about a
release or threatened release (which does include passive migra-
tion) and transfers the property without disclosing such knowl-
edge, that person becomes liable, not as a former owner under
section 9607(a)(2), but as a current owner under section
9607(a)(1), which designates a class of PRPs that is liable regard-
less of whether there was a disposal."
However, there is one loophole that may remain open. If an
operator of a facility discovers that a release or threatened release
is about to take place, but no active disposal had taken place at
the facility during the operator's tenure, this operator could still
transfer operation of the facility to another party and become a
past operator. If active disposal is required, as a past operator the
person might slip through the CERCLA cracks. Section
9601(35)(C) does not address this problem because it refers only
26 Nurad, 966 F.2d at 845 (citation omitted).
27 Id.
2a That person also loses the benefit of the innocent landowner defense and all other
defenses under § 9607(b)(3):
Nothing in this paragraph or in section 9607(b)(3) of this title shall diminish
the liability of any previous owner or operator of such facility who would
otherwise be liable under this chapter. Notwithstanding this paragraph, if the
defendant obtained actual knowledge of the release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance at such facility when the defendant owned the real
property and then subsequently transferred ownership of the property to an-
other person without disclosing such knowledge, such defendant shall be
treated as liable under section 9607(a)(1) of this title and no defense under
section 9607(b)(3) of this title shall be available to such defendant.
CERCLA § 101(35)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C) (Supp. 1993); United States v. Peter-
sen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1353 (N.D. III. 1992). Moreover, criminal
penalties are imposed for failure to report a release in a timely fashion. Petersen, 806 F.
Supp. at 1353. Also, prospective purchasers have an incentive to investigate the environ-
mental condition of the property before purchase, which lessens the ability of an owner to
avoid liability or to obtain the market value, as if in an environmentally unimpaired state,
of the property upon a subsequent sale. Petersen, 806 F. Supp. at 1353.
[VOL. 9:255
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to owners who sell the real property. The problem with operators
may, as a practical matter, be less substantial than with owners
but, nevertheless, represents some real risk.
The Fourth Circuit was also concerned about the differing
treatment between current owners and previous owners, each of
whom had not actively disposed of hazardous substances. The
Fourth Circuit noted that the district court's requirement of active
participation for a disposal to exist would introduce "the anoma-
lous situation where a current owner ... who never used the stor-
age tanks could bear a substantial share of the cleanup costs,
while a former owner who was similarly situated would face no
liability at all. '"2 9 While the specter of unequal treatment for
seemingly equivalent situations nearly always raises the eyebrows
of jurists, the Nurad court failed to account for the fact that Con-
gress apparently created such a distinction when it chose different
requirements to delineate the liability of present owners and that
of prior owners. Present owners are liable for response costs with-
out regard to whether hazardous substances were disposed of dur-
ing their ownership, while the liability of previous owners exists
only if hazardous substances were disposed of during their owner-
ship.30 This potential disparate treatment of current and prior
owners is sanctioned by CERCLA itself. Instead of supporting the
congressional structure, the Fourth Circuit's approach in Nurad
substantially erodes the congressionally-established distinction be-
tween present and former owners. Given the breadth of Nurad's
interpretation of what constitutes disposal, the difference between
the liability of past and present owners and operators becomes
practically nonexistent. 31
B. Passive Migration Nullifies the Innocent Landowner Defense
The Nurad decision, along with similar holdings in other
cases,"2 threatens the very existence of the innocent landowner de-
" Nurad, 966 F.2d at 845.
3O Compare CERCLA § 107(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988) with CERCLA
§ 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988).
31 Presumably, unless the original owner injected the hazardous substance into some
type of sealed, leak-proof container, all intervening owners will be liable to the same extent
as the present owner. See Petersen, 806 F. Supp. at 1352.
" Although the courts are split, a slight majority of the cases decided to date held
that mere passive migration constitutes disposal. Stanley Works v. Snydergeneral Corp.,
781 F. Supp. 659, 662 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (noting split of authority and citing cases); see
C.P.C. Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 731 F. Supp. 783, 789 (W.D. Mich. 1989)
1993-94]
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fense. A previous owner cannot qualify for the innocent landowner
defense if disposal occurred while that person owned the property
in question. Third-party defenses are only available if the release
is caused solely by the act or omission of a third party who is not
in a contractual relationship with the defendant.8 3 Section
9601(35)(A) provides that the term "contractual relationship"
used in restricting the third-party defense includes land contracts
"unless the real property on which the facility is located was ac-
quired by the defendant after the disposal or placement of the
hazardous substance." ' Thus, if disposal includes the passive mi-
gration of hazardous substances deposited by a previous owner, an
intervening landowner could not qualify for the innocent land-
owner defense because disposal would have occurred during its
ownership.
Some courts have recognized that such an interpretation
would nullify the innocent landowner defense.35 For example, the
court in HR W Systems, Inc. v. Washington Gas Light Co. deter-
mined that if the definition of disposal as determined by the
Nurad Court was applied to the innocent landowner defense,
"there would be, for all practical purposes, no innocent landowner
defense, so broad is the statute's definition of disposal."8 6 How-
ever, the HRW Systems, Inc. Court attempted to resolve this di-
lemma by intimating that the term "disposal" could have one
meaning when used in section 9607(a)(2) and another meaning
when used in section 9607(b)(3). a7 While the HRW Systems
court recognized the problem created by the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion in Nurad, its solution of contradictory readings of the term
"disposal" is unsupported by the language of CERCLA. While
this differing approach may have appeal when Congress is draft-
(citing ample case law to support a broad interpretation of disposal); cf. Petersen, 806 F.
Supp. at 1350 (noting that courts that have decided the issue are about evenly split).
33 The act or omission must occur "in connection with a contractual relationship, ex-
isting directly or indirectly, with the defendant." CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(b)(3) (1988).
3, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (Supp.1993).
35 See HR.W. Systems, Inc. v. Washington Gas Light Co., 823 F. Supp. 318, 348 (D.
Md. 1993); Petersen, 806 F. Supp. at 1352; In re Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc., 115 B.R.
559, 566 n.3 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990).
11 H.R. W. Systems, 823 F. Supp. at 348. Without any discussion or analysis, another
district court rejected the contention that the interpretation of disposal to include passive
migration would effectively dismantle the innocent landowner defense. See Stanley Works
v. Snydergeneral Corp., 781 F. Supp. 659, 664 (E.D. Cal. 1990).
" See H.R.W. Systems, 823 F. Supp. at 348.
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ing or amending the statute'38 the current scheme of CERCLA
provides no support for these contrary definitions of the same term
in the same section of the same statute.
C. Disposal Does Not Include Passive Migration of Hazardous
Substances
Other courts have determined that passive migration does not
constitute disposal under CERCLA.3 9 Because hazardous sub-
stances can continue to migrate passively long after their intro-
duction into the environment, the Nurad court's "sweeping inter-
pretation of disposal" would effectively impose CERCLA liability
on every owner in the chain of title after the initial disposal.
40 If
Congress had chosen to impose liability on every intervening
owner in the chain of title, it could have done so, but it did not.
Congress knew how to draft language that created liability with-
out regard to disposal. Congress did so with respect to current
owners and operators. Past owners and operators are liable only if
disposal occurred during their ownership or operation, while pre-
sent owners and operators are liable without regard to whether
there was disposal during their tenure. Given the Nurad court's
interpretation of disposal, for all practical purposes the "at the
time of disposal" language in section 9607(a)(2) is meaningless as
it applies to all intervening owners of polluted property. If Con-
gress had intended such a result, it presumably would not have
chosen different language.
In perhaps the most cogent discussion of the issue to date,4 '
the Northern District of Illinois in United States v. Petersen Sand
& Gravel, Inc. recognized and discussed the conflict between a
definition of disposal which included passive migration and the ex-
istence of the innocent landowner defense. In Petersen, the gov-
ernment sought to hold an intervening operator liable under sec-
tion 9607(a)(2) as an operator at the time of disposal on the
theory, among others, that passive disposal occurred while the in-
" See infra pp. 16-18.
' United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346 (N.D. Ill. 1992);
Snediker Developers Ltd. Partnership v. Evans, 773 F. Supp. 984, 988-89 (E.D. Mich.
1991); Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454, 1457 (E.D. Cal. 1989); In re Diamond
Reo Trucks, Inc., 115 B.R. 559, 565-66 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990).
*o See Snediker, 773 F. Supp. at 989.
806 F. Supp. 1346 (N.D. Ill. 1992),
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tervening operator ran the property." After noting the prior deci-
sions on passive migration, the court engaged in a searching anal-
ysis in an attempt to reconcile the various terms within the
definition of disposal and the innocent landowner defense. Instead
of merely focusing on whether the event terms of the disposal defi-
nition (discharge, deposit, spilling, leaking, etc.) included active
and/or passive terms, the Petersen court also examined the re-
mainder of the definition of disposal. 3 The second part of the defi-
nition requires that for such an event to be a disposal, the hazard-
ous waste must "enter the environment or be emitted into the air
or discharged into any waters, including ground waters."" Ac-
cording to the Petersen court,
[t]he kind of migration of substances contemplated by "passive"
disposal, however, is itself an entering of the environment; it is
not a predicate to entering the environment. Congress appreci-
ated the difference: when it defined "release" in CERCLA, Con-
gress did so as a series of events (spilling, leaking, etc.) followed
simply by "into the environment."43
Whereas, when Congress defined disposal, it did so as a series of
events followed by "so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or
any constituent thereof may enter the environment."" From this
distinction, the Petersen court found support for its conclusion
that passive migration did not constitute disposal even though it
does constitute a release .11
7
The Petersen court drew further support for its interpretation
by comparing the contextual relationship in CERCLA between
release and disposal. 8 The court noted:
Congress could have made [past owner and] operator liability
depend on a "release"; instead, Congress designed the entire
CERCLA response scheme to activate whenever a "release" oc-
curred, but limited the liability for [past owners and] operators
to those who were [owners and] operators during a "disposal."
Some distinction must have been intended, and the so-called in-
" Id. at 1350.
41 Id. at 1351.
" Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA) § 1004(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988).
" United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1351 (N.D. Ill.
1992) (citation omitted).
' 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988).
Petersen, 806 F. Supp. at 1351.
" Id.
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nocent owner defense shows that the distinction must have been
between active and passive events. 9
The Petersen court correctly noted that "in order for the [in-
nocent landowner] defense to apply in all but the rarest of circum-
stances, 'disposal' must be limited to its active meaning." 50 Giving
disposal passive meaning would eviscerate the plain purpose of the
innocent landowner defense, which was to exclude certain owners
who purchased the land after the hazardous waste was placed on
the land.
The Petersen court also noted that by juxtaposing release and
disposal, the innocent landowner defense makes the relative scope
of the two terms "unequivocally clear. The reference to a period
'after' a disposal but during ('is the subject of) a 'release' or
'threatened' release establishes that 'disposal' refers to a discrete
human act with a discrete ending."51
Finally, the Petersen court examined the other references to
disposal in CERCLA and noted that based on those other uses,
"giving 'disposal' a passive meaning controverts the plain lan-
guage of CERCLA."52 Even though the Petersen result is the bet-
ter reasoned approach and gives effect to all parts of the CER-
CLA scheme, rational people could certainly disagree as to
whether such a passive meaning controverts the plain language of
CERCLA.
While the Petersen court provided a thorough analysis of the
problem and arrived at a decision in which the innocent land-
owner defense was preserved, many will find that court's analysis
more cumbersome and complicated than that of the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Nurad, which is more straightforward even though not as
precise. Moreover, the Petersen court's interpretation of disposal
does not solve the problem discussed above regarding an operator
who has not actively disposed of waste but who discovers that a
release has occurred or is threatened. Such an operator can trans-
40 Id.
50 Id. at 1352. "Otherwise, this defense would be available only to innocent owners
who are fortunate enough to have purchased a facility where all the hazardous waste is
sealed in concrete [because] any seepage or leaking on a site occurring after the purchase
would eliminate the defense." Id.
5' Id. at 1352.
62 Id.
1993-94]
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
fer the property and be viewed as a past operator with the section
9607(b)(3) defenses still available.5 3
CONCLUSION
For various reasons, the decisions of the different courts ad-
dressing the passive disposal issue are all somewhat unsatisfactory.
On the one hand, courts such as the Nurad court which include
passive migration in the definition of disposal ignore the effect of
such an interpretation on the innocent landowner defense, the dis-
tinction between the concepts of release and disposal, and the sec-
ond part of the definition of disposal. On the other hand, courts
holding that "disposal" does not include passive migration, such as
the Petersen court, do not completely satisfy the questions regard-
ing the passive nature of some of the terms used in defining dispo-
sal, require a more rigorous analysis, and do not directly prevent
past operators from avoiding CERCLA liability. However, given
the current structure of CERCLA, the interpretation given by the
Petersen court is highly preferable to the Fourth Circuit's inter-
pretation in Nurad which annihilates the innocent landowner
defense.
Ideally, Congress should resolve these problems and the un-
certainty surrounding these issues by amending CERCLA to clar-
ify the passive migration issue and the extent of the innocent land-
owner defense. One approach might be for Congress to adopt
expressly the concept of passive migration into the definition of
disposal and to create an "active disposal" and a "passive dispo-
sal" category. Congress could then amend section 9607(a)(2) to
provide for liability for past owners or operators during times of
active or passive disposal. Congress could expressly state that the
innocent landowner defense does not apply if there was an active
disposal but can still apply if only a passive disposal occurred dur-
ing the ownership or operation of the property.
One significant problem with this approach is that the ele-
ments of the innocent landowner defense can be nearly impossible
to satisfy for someone already identified as a PRP 4 By enlarging
" The potential criminal penalties for failure to report the release and the incentive
any purchaser would have to investigate the property significantly decrease the likelihood
of any such operator successfully making this transition, id. at 1353.
'" "Courts have been generally reluctant to find that a PRP qualifies for the innocent
purchaser defense." Kyle E. McSlarrow et al., A Decade of Superfund Litigation: CER-
CLA Case Law from 1981-1991, in SUPERFUND DESKBOOK 530 (1992) (citations omitted).
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the universe of former owners and operators who are PRPs and
making them rely on the innocent landowner defense to escape
liability, this approach would solve the clarity issue but would
catch too many truly innocent landowners in the CERCLA liabil-
ity web. Thus, this approach should be discarded.
The preferred approach would be for Congress to state ex-
pressly in the definition section that disposal does not include pas-
sive migration of wastes but only includes active placement, leak-
ing, spilling, etc. Section 9601(35)(C) is adequate to prevent
property owners who become aware of passive migration of wastes
on their property from escaping liability by selling their property
without disclosing this information because such passive migration
would constitute a release even though it does not constitute a dis-
posal, and any transfer of the ownership without disclosing that
knowledge would subject the seller to liability as a current owner,
causing the entire issue of disposal to vanish. However, section
9601(35)(C) needs to be amended to provide the same penalty
and forfeiture of defenses for current operators who become aware
of a release or threatened release but transfer the operation of the
facility without disclosing the release or threatened release of haz-
ardous substances.
Such a proposal closes the potential loophole for operators to
escape liability while respecting the congressionally-sanctioned in-
nocent landowner defense. Also, this suggested approach will not
broaden the universe of PRPs who are past owners or operators
beyond the point where it is today. This proposal is similar to the
result reached by the Petersen court, with the advantage of clos-
ing the potential operator loophole, but the result is clearer and
more uniform. This approach solves the problem of each court
having to make the difficult analysis of Petersen which inevitably
will lead to differing results. Such congressional action is prefera-
ble to allowing courts to keep wrestling with the issue because,
despite the Petersen court's statement to the contrary, the pre-
ferred result is not readily evident from the plain language of
CERCLA.
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